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The separation of ownership and control allows controlling shareholders to pursue private benefits.
We develop an analytically tractable dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study asset pricing
and welfare implications of imperfect investor protection. Consistent with empirical evidence, the
model predicts that countries with weaker investor protection have more incentives to overinvest, lower
Tobin's q, higher return volatility, larger risk premium, and higher interest rate. Calibrating the model
to the Korean economy reveals that perfecting investor protection increases the stock market's value








Graduate School of Business
Columbia University
3022 Broadway, Uris Hall 812
New York, NY 10027
and NBER
nw2128@columbia.eduIt is widely accepted that governance problems are of ￿rst-order importance in many countries
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1998, 2000a)). Corporations in many countries are
run by controlling shareholders whose cash ￿ ow rights in the ￿rm are substantially smaller than
their control rights (La Porta et al. (1999)). For example, controlling shareholders may ac-
quire complete control with cash ￿ ow rights signi￿cantly lower than 50% via dual-class shares,
pyramid-ownership structures, or cross-ownership (Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis (2000)).
The separation of ownership and control allows controlling shareholders to pursue private ben-
e￿ts at the cost of outside shareholders. The size of private bene￿ts depends in large part on
the extent of investor protection and corporate governance safeguarding outside investors.1 La
Porta et al. (2002), Claessens et al. (2002), Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004), and Gompers,
Ishii, and Metrick (2003), among others, document how imperfect investor protection lowers
￿rm value.
Investor protection in￿ uences not only ￿rm value as emphasized in the literature, but also
equilibrium interest rates, asset returns, and welfare costs. Intuitively, agents￿consumption
and savings decisions and ￿rms￿cost of capital are fundamentally linked in general equilibrium,
which depends in turn on ￿rms￿production and investment decisions and the extent of agency
con￿ icts. However, to date little theoretical research has been devoted to formulating equilib-
rium asset pricing implications of agency con￿ icts. Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) present a
static model with risk-neutral agents and determine the interest rate in general equilibrium. In
this paper, we present one of the ￿rst dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models to study
the implications of imperfect investor protection for risk sharing and asset pricing. We therefore
provide one of the ￿rst quantitative frameworks to assess the magnitudes of both the loss of
investor welfare and the reduction in market value due to imperfect investor protection.We introduce two new features into a standard production-based equilibrium asset pricing
model. First, we assume that output ￿ uctuations arise from shocks to the marginal e¢ ciency
of investment (Keynes (1936)), i.e. investment-speci￿c technology shocks. This assumption is
motivated by the growing literature that emphasizes the important role of investment-speci￿c
technology shocks as a source of aggregate volatility (Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Hu⁄man
(1988), Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997), and Fisher (2006), among others). Second,
in our model, ￿rms￿investment decisions are made by self-interested controlling shareholders
who extract private bene￿ts from outside shareholders (Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen
and Meckling (1976)). We embed the con￿ ict of interest and the implied heterogeneity between
controlling shareholders and outside shareholders in an equilibrium setting.
To isolate the e⁄ects of our assumption of investment-speci￿c technology shocks on real
investment and asset prices, we ￿rst consider a benchmark economy with no con￿ icts of interest.
Under perfect investor protection, the controlling shareholder rationally pursues no private
bene￿ts (because of in￿nite marginal cost of stealing) and thus he behaves in the interest
of outside shareholders. Our benchmark model is the extension of representative-agent asset
pricing models such as Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985) (henceforth, CIR). As in CIR and other
investment models, investment increases the capital stock on average. However, in our model
the investment-speci￿c technology shocks make the representative agent less willing to invest in
capital: The amount of capital in the next period depends stochastically on how new investment
merges with the existing capital. A risk-averse investor dislikes the volatility in output induced
by investment and hence lowers investment, ceteris paribus. This makes the newly invested
capital less desirable than the installed capital. As a result, Tobin￿ s q is larger than unity. In
contrast, in the CIR model Tobin￿ s q is equal to unity. This technological speci￿cation is a
2key di⁄erence between our benchmark model and the seminal CIR model. To the best of our
knowledge, ours is the ￿rst model predicting Tobin￿ s q to be larger than unity in an equilibrium
framework ￿ la CIR without technological frictions such as adjustment costs or investment
irreversibility.
When investor protection is imperfect, a con￿ ict of interest arises between the controlling
shareholder and outside shareholders. The controlling shareholder values private bene￿ts more
under weaker investor protection and is able to derive greater private bene￿ts in larger ￿rms
(Baumol (1959), Williamson (1964), and Jensen (1986)). Thus, the controlling shareholder has
stronger incentives to invest under weaker investor protection, ceteris paribus. However, with
shocks to the marginal e¢ ciency of investment, more investment means higher volatility of
capital accumulation, which is undesirable. In equilibrium, we show that the e⁄ect induced by
the extraction of private bene￿ts dominates. This leads to the prediction that weaker investor
protection implies more investment and more volatility, ceteris paribus.
The controlling shareholder￿ s incentives to pursue private bene￿ts and distort investment
under weaker investor protection imply a lower dividend payout, ceteris paribus. Tobin￿ s q
(from the outside shareholders￿perspective) is lower, re￿ ecting both the extraction of private
bene￿ts and investment distortions by the controlling shareholder. These predictions are in
line with La Porta et al. (2000b), who ￿nd that corporate payouts are lower in countries with
weaker investor protection, and La Porta et al. (2002), Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004), who ￿nd that ￿rm value increases with investor protection.
Our model also predicts that the equity risk premium is higher in countries with weaker
investor protection. The equilibrium equity premium is proportional to the variance of output.
The higher investment under weaker investor protection increases both the volatility of capital
3accumulation and that of output and hence increases the equilibrium risk premium. This pre-
diction is consistent with the cross-country evidence in Hail and Leuz (2004) and Daouk,Lee,
and Ng (2004), who establish a positive link between excess returns and various investor protec-
tion variables. Harvey (1995) shows that emerging markets display higher return volatility and
larger equity risk premia. Since emerging market economies have on average weaker corporate
governance, these papers supply additional evidence in line with our theory.
Finally, the model predicts that countries with weaker investor protection have a higher
interest rate. The intuition is as follows. Weaker investor protection generates a greater in-
centive to invest and hence higher future output. Predicting higher output, agents￿consump-
tion smoothing motive leads them to borrow, which raises the interest rate. However, higher
investment also makes capital accumulation more volatile and implies a stronger desire for pre-
cautionary savings, which lowers the interest rate. Because the former e⁄ect dominates, the
interest rate is higher under weaker investor protection. The higher interest rate and the higher
cost of capital (sum of the interest rate and the risk premium) have equilibrium feedback e⁄ects
discouraging investment, ceteris paribus. We show that the agency channel e⁄ect (of overinvest-
ing to pursue future private bene￿ts) is stronger than the cost of capital e⁄ect in equilibrium.
Therefore, the equilibrium investment-capital ratio and the interest rate both decrease with
investor protection. We ￿nd evidence in support of our interest rate prediction using data in
Campbell (2003).
We present a calibration of the model that allows us to assess the quantitative signi￿cance
of improving investor protection. Speci￿cally, we calibrate the model to the United States and
South Korea to match estimates of the two countries￿private bene￿ts. The model predicts that
moving to a perfect investor protection regime leads to a stock market revaluation of 2:49%
4in the United States and 21:96% in Korea. The welfare implications of such improvements in
investor protection are very large. Outside investors in the U.S. and Korea are willing to give
up, respectively, 0:38% and 11:17% of the capital stock they own to move to perfect investor
protection. This represents $43 billion of U.S. market capitalization and $4.7 billion of Korean
market capitalization. On the other hand, the U.S. and Korean controlling shareholders are
willing to give up 2:1% and 8:4% of their capital stock to maintain the status quo, respectively.
We show that these welfare numbers are robust to di⁄erent calibrations.
These calculations suggest signi￿cant wealth redistribution from controlling shareholders to
outside shareholders by enhancing investor protection, particularly for Korea. Of course, the
political reform necessary to improve investor protection is by no means an easy task, precisely
because of the signi￿cant wealth redistribution that would follow. After all, the controlling
shareholders and incumbent entrepreneurs are often among the strongest interest groups in the
policy making process, particularly in countries with weaker investor protection.
Lastly, we test two new empirical predictions that result from our speci￿cation of investment-
speci￿c technology shocks and the equilibrium solution: A positive association between the
investment-capital ratio and the variance of GDP growth and between the investment-capital
ratio and the variance of stock returns. We construct measures of the long-run investment-
capital ratio and test our hypotheses on a cross-section of 40 countries. We provide evidence
consistent with both hypotheses, controlling for other sources of volatility.
The paper that is most closely related to ours is Dow, Gorton, and Krishnamurthy (2005)
(henceforth, DGK). They study the e⁄ects of agency con￿ icts on equilibrium asset prices and
investment by integrating managerial empire building as in Jensen (1986) into an otherwise
neoclassical CIR-style asset pricing model. DGK analyze the manager-shareholder con￿ ict in
5￿rms with dispersed ownership.2 As a result, because managers￿wealth has zero measure in
aggregate, DGK do not need to model their consumption and portfolio allocation decisions. In
contrast, we study the agency con￿ ict between controlling shareholders and outside sharehold-
ers. Because controlling shareholders in many countries claim a signi￿cant share of aggregate
wealth, we therefore model the controlling shareholders￿consumption and portfolio allocation
decisions jointly with the outside shareholders￿consumption and portfolio allocation decisions
and derive equilibrium implications for risk sharing, welfare redistribution, and various equi-
librium prices and quantities. The two models also di⁄er in the production technology. DGK
assume that capital accumulation follows the process given by CIR and hence they predict To-
bin￿ s q to be unity, independent of agency con￿ icts. In contrast, we assume investment-speci￿c
technology shocks, and predict that Tobin￿ s q is larger than unity (even under perfect investor
protection) and increasing with investor protection. Our model therefore provides an explana-
tion for the evidence that countries with weaker investor protection observe higher risk premia
and larger volatility. DGK and our model do share a common and key prediction; namely,
that ￿rms overinvest. However, to endogenize the degree of overinvestment DGK endow share-
holders with a costly auditing technology, while we use an exogenously speci￿ed cost function
for private bene￿ts to model the degree of investor protection. Finally, with respect to prefer-
ences, DGK assume that investors have logarithmic preferences whereas we allow controlling
and outside shareholders to share any degree of constant relative risk aversion.
We design our heterogenous-agent model with the objective of delivering a complete charac-
terization of both resource allocation (over time and across shareholders) and equilibrium asset
pricing that can be reconciled with empirical evidence. In order to achieve this objective in a
parsimonious setting, we follow La Porta et al. (2002) and Lan and Wang (2006) and model
6investor protection by adopting a simple convex cost function for the controlling shareholder￿ s
pursuit of private bene￿ts.3 The alternative is to model agency con￿ icts via a contracting ap-
proach. Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald (2004) study a two-period overlapping generations
model where entrepreneurs can abscond with revenues and project ￿nanciers are constrained by
this agency friction. They focus on equilibrium implications for the interest rate and economic
growth. However, they do not analyze welfare implications and asset pricing predictions for the
risk premium, Tobin￿ s q, and volatility.
It is worth noting that there is also a growing literature on optimal dynamic contracting in
corporate ￿nance. However, these models are often cast as a single ￿rm contracting problem
and produce no asset pricing implications. Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) and DeMarzo
and Fishman (2006) study the e⁄ects of ￿nancing constraints and agency con￿ icts on real in-
vestments. These models generate underinvestment, rather than overinvestment, because the
degree of underinvestment becomes an incentive alignment tool between the investors and the
manager. In our model, overinvestment arises because of the pursuit of private bene￿ts by
the controlling shareholder. This is likely to be the dominant issue for larger ￿rms around the
world whereas the underinvestment implied by these contracting models is potentially more im-
portant for smaller ￿rms. DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) formulate a continuous-time dynamic
contracting problem and provide an optimal capital structure implementation that alleviates
the friction arising from outside investors not being able to observe the cash ￿ ows generated by
the ￿rm.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the model and
states the main theorem. Section II discusses the model￿ s solution under the benchmark with
perfect investor protection. Section III characterizes the equilibrium outcome and provides
7intuition for the model￿ s solution. Section IV gives the model￿ s main predictions for the e⁄ects
of investor protection on investment and asset prices. Section V provides a calibration and
supplies quantitative predictions on the value of improving investor protection. Section VI
presents empirical evidence on two of the model￿ s new predictions and Section VII concludes.
The Appendix contains technical details and proofs of the theorem and propositions.
I. The Model
The economy is populated by a continuum of two types of agents, controlling shareholders and
outside shareholders, identi￿ed with subscripts ￿1￿and ￿2,￿respectively. Outside sharehold-
ers are all identical. All ￿rms and their respective controlling shareholders are assumed to
be identical as well and subject to the same shocks. This assumption substantially simpli￿es
our analysis because we do not need to keep track of the controlling shareholders￿holdings in
other ￿rms. Thus, without loss of generality, we analyze the decision problems of a representa-
tive controlling shareholder and a representative outside shareholder. All agents have in￿nite
horizons and time is continuous.
A. Setup
Production and Investment Opportunities. Firms are all-equity ￿nanced. Output is
produced via a constant returns to scale technology hK (t), where h is the productivity level
and K (t) is the ￿rm￿ s capital stock. We assume that the capital stock evolves according to
dK(t) = (I (t) ￿ ￿K (t))dt + ￿I (t)dZ(t); (1)
8where I (t) is investment, ￿ > 0 is the depreciation rate, ￿ > 0 is a volatility parameter, Z (t) is
a Brownian motion, and K (0) > 0.
The capital accumulation speci￿cation (1) is a continuous-time version of Greenwood, Her-
cowitz, and Hu⁄man (1988), which is based on Keynes￿(1936) argument that production is
subject to shocks to the marginal e¢ ciency of investment. Equation (1) is di⁄erent from the
traditional speci￿cation of shocks to total factor productivity (TFP). Our motivation for this
choice of speci￿cation is three-fold. First, quantitatively speaking, these shocks play an impor-
tant role in the economy. Identifying shocks to the marginal e¢ ciency of investment with shocks
to the relative price of investment goods, Greenwodd, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997, 2000) doc-
ument that these shocks account for 60% of post-war U.S. growth (Greenwood, Hercowitz, and
Krusell (2000)) and 30% of output ￿ uctuations in the post-war U.S. period (Greenwood, Her-
cowitz, and Krusell (1997)). Using an econometric approach that relaxes the identi￿cation in
Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997), Fisher (2006) shows that 50% of U.S. ￿ uctuations
are accounted for by shocks to the marginal e¢ ciency of investment.4 Second, the standard
technology shock speci￿cation implies that recessions are caused by a TFP decline, that is, tech-
nical regress, which has met substantial skepticism among macroeconomists (Romer (2006)).
Third, the assumption of investment-speci￿c technological change is analytically convenient to
work with.5 The capital accumulation process (1) in our paper and those in CIR and Sun-
daresan (1984) are subject to shocks, unlike the conventional speci￿cation. However, unlike in
CIR and Sundaresan (1984), where uncertainty of capital accumulation is proportional to the
level of capital stock K, here uncertainty of capital accumulation is proportional to the level of
investment I. We will show that this di⁄erence has an important implication for Tobin￿ s q in
Section II.
9Imperfect Investor Protection and Private Bene￿ts. The controlling shareholder owns
a ￿xed fraction ￿ < 1 of the ￿rm.6 Following Shleifer and Vishny (1997), La Porta et al. (2002),
and the literature on investor protection, we also assume that the controlling shareholder is fully
entrenched and has complete control over the ￿rm￿ s investment and payout policies. We refer
readers to Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis (2000) for details on how control rights can di⁄er
from cash ￿ ow rights (via dual-class shares, pyramid-ownership structures, or cross-ownership)
and to La Porta, L￿pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) for evidence that control rights are often
concentrated.
Building on Johnson et al. (2000) and La Porta et al. (2002), we model private bene￿ts
via a stealing technology.7 The controlling shareholder may ￿steal￿a fraction s(t) from gross





The parameter ￿ is a measure of investor protection.8 A higher ￿ implies a larger marginal cost
￿shK of diverting cash for private bene￿ts and hence stronger investor protection. Later we
impose a parametric region for ￿ to ensure an interior solution for the stealing level s(t). We
choose the quadratic cost formula (2) for simplicity, but the model￿ s intuition carries over to
other convex cost function speci￿cations.
Investment I (t) equals output hK (t) net of dividends D(t) and private bene￿ts extracted
by the controlling shareholder s(t)hK (t). Thus, we have
I (t) = hK(t) ￿ D(t) ￿ s(t)hK(t): (3)
10To summarize, we have introduced two key assumptions into the model: (i) The capital
accumulation technology (1) subject to investment-speci￿c technological shocks; and (ii) the
controlling shareholder￿ s private bene￿ts technology (2). Below we show that the interaction
of these two assumptions generates the key results and insights of our paper.
Controlling Shareholder. The controlling shareholder has lifetime utility over consumption














;￿ > 0: (5)
The rate of time preference is ￿ > 0 and ￿ is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. The
scale-invariance property of CRRA utility proves useful in keeping our model analysis tractable
(as in Merton (1971), for example).
Let M (t) denote the time-t cash ￿ ow to the controlling shareholder. It includes both the
dividend component ￿D(t) and the private bene￿ts component, and is given as follows:
M (t) = ￿D(t) + s(t)hK(t) ￿ ￿(s(t);hK(t)): (6)
Let C1 and W1 denote the controlling shareholder￿ s consumption and wealth processes, respec-
tively. We assume that the controlling shareholder can invest in the risk-free asset but cannot
trade in the risky asset. This implies that his tradable ￿liquid￿wealth equals his risk-free hold-
ings: W1 (t) = B1 (t). Let r(t) be the risk-free interest rate at t. The controlling shareholder￿ s
11wealth evolves according to
dW1(t) = (r(t)W1(t) + M (t) ￿ C1(t))dt; (7)
where we assume that W1 (0) = 0.
In summary, the controlling shareholder chooses fD(t);s(t);C1 (t) : t ￿ 0g to maximize
his lifetime utility de￿ned in (4) and (5), subject to the capital accumulation process (1),
￿ ow-of-funds equations (3) and (6), his wealth accumulation process (7), and a transversality
condition speci￿ed in the Appendix, with ￿rm investment fI (t) : t ￿ 0g, ￿rm capital stock
fK (t) : t ￿ 0g, and liquid wealth fW1 (t) : t ￿ 0g being determined by (3), (1), and (6)-(7).
In solving his optimization problem, the controlling shareholder takes the equilibrium inter-
est rate process fr(t) : t ￿ 0g as given.
Real and Financial Assets. Without loss of generality, we may denote ￿K and ￿K as the
drift and volatility processes for the equilibrium capital accumulation process
dK(t) = ￿K(t)K (t)dt + ￿K(t)K (t)dZ(t): (8)
Similarly, we may write the equilibrium processes for dividends D and ￿rm value P as
dD(t) = ￿D(t)D(t)dt + ￿D(t)D(t)dZ(t); (9)
dP(t) = ￿P(t)P (t)dt + ￿P(t)P (t)dZ(t); (10)
where ￿D and ￿P are the corresponding equilibrium drift processes, and ￿D and ￿K are the
equilibrium volatility processes. There is also a risk-free asset available in zero net supply. Both
12the outside shareholders and the controlling shareholder may trade the risk-free asset. Later
we solve for the drift processes ￿K, ￿D, and ￿P, the volatility processes ￿K, ￿D, and ￿P, and
the equilibrium interest rate r. While ￿K, ￿D, ￿P; ￿K, ￿D, ￿P, and r can be stochastic and
path dependent, in Section III. we show that all these processes are deterministic and constant
in equilibrium. As we discuss later, this result depends on the assumptions of constant returns-
to-scale production technology, linearity of the stealing technology in K; and CRRA utility,
among others.
Outside Shareholders. Outside shareholders have the same preferences given in (4) and
(5), evaluated at the consumption process C2 (t). Each outside shareholder solves a standard
consumption-asset allocation problem similar to Merton (1971). Unlike Merton (1971), in our
model both the stock price and the interest rate are endogenously determined in equilibrium.
Let ! (t) be the fraction of wealth invested in equity at t. Let ￿(t) denote the time-t risk
premium, which is given by ￿(t) ￿ ￿P (t) + D(t)=P (t) ￿ r(t). Following Merton (1971), each
outside shareholder accumulates his wealth as follows:
dW2(t) = (r(t)W2(t) ￿ C2(t) + ! (t)W2 (t)￿(t))dt + ￿P(t)! (t)W2(t)dZ(t); (11)
with W2(0) = 0. The outside shareholders￿risk-free holdings are B2 (t) = (1 ￿ ! (t))W2 (t).
Each outside shareholder chooses fC2 (t);! (t) : t ￿ 0g to maximize his lifetime utility func-
tion subject to the wealth dynamics (11) and a transversality condition speci￿ed in the Ap-
pendix. In solving this problem, each outside shareholder takes the equilibrium dividend, ￿rm
value, and interest rate processes as given.
13B. Equilibrium: De￿nition and Existence
We de￿ne the equilibrium in our economy and state the theorem characterizing the equilibrium.
De￿nition 1 An equilibrium has the following properties:
(i) fC1 (t);s(t);I (t);D(t) : t ￿ 0g solve the controlling shareholder￿ s problem for a given
interest rate process fr(t) : t ￿ 0g;
(ii) fC2 (t);! (t) : t ￿ 0g solve each outside shareholder￿ s problem for given interest rate
fr(t) : t ￿ 0g; stock price, and dividend payout stochastic processes fP (t);D(t) : t ￿ 0g;
(iii) the risk-free asset market clears (i.e., B1(t) + B2(t) = 0):
W1 (t) + (1 ￿ ! (t))W2 (t) = 0; for all t; (12)
(iv) the stock market clears for outside shareholders that is
1 ￿ ￿ = ! (t)W2 (t)=P (t); for all t; and, (13)
(v) the consumption goods market clears, in that
C1 (t) + C2 (t) + I (t) = hK (t) ￿ ￿(s(t);hK (t)); for all t: (14)
Condition (v) states that the available resources in the economy, hK ￿￿(s;hK), are either
consumed or invested in the ￿rm. The amount diverted, shK; is a transfer from the ￿rm to the
controlling shareholder, but the cost of diversion, ￿(s;hK), is a dead-weight loss.
In general, in heterogeneous agent models such as ours, one needs to keep track of the
dynamics of the wealth distribution, namely the evolution of (W1 (t);W2 (t)), in addition to
14standard state variables such as the capital stock K. It turns out that the endogenously
determined wealth distribution does not complicate the equilibrium analysis in our model. The
following theorem provides a complete characterization of the equilibrium. We will provide
intuition for the equilibrium in Section 3. The proof is relegated to the appendix.
Theorem 1 Under Assumptions 1 to 5 listed in the Appendix, there exists an equilibrium with
the following properties. The outside shareholders have zero risk-free asset holdings (B2 (t) = 0)
and invest all their wealth in equity, with ! (t) = 1. Outside shareholders￿consumption equals
their entitled dividends:
C2 (t) = (1 ￿ ￿)D(t): (15)
The controlling shareholder also holds zero risk-free assets (B1 (t) = 0). He diverts a constant
fraction of gross revenue:




The controlling shareholder￿ s consumption C1(t) and the ￿rm￿ s investment I(t) and dividends
D(t) are proportional to the ￿rm￿ s capital stock K(t), in that C1 (t)=K (t) = M (t)=K (t) = m;
I(t)=K(t) = i, D(t)=K(t) = d. In equilibrium, we have
m = ￿[(1 +  )h ￿ i] > 0; (17)
i =






2(￿ + 1)￿2 ((1 +  )h ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))




d = (1 ￿ ￿)h ￿ i > 0; (19)
where   = (1 ￿ ￿)2=(2￿￿). The equilibrium dividend process (9), the capital accumulation
process (8), and the stock price process (10) all follow geometric Brownian motions with drift
15and volatility coe¢ cients given by
￿D = ￿K = ￿P = i ￿ ￿; (20)
￿D = ￿K = ￿P = i￿: (21)










The equilibrium interest rate is
r = ￿ + ￿ (i ￿ ￿) ￿
￿2i2
2
￿ (￿ + 1): (23)
The key insight behind the results of our model is that no trade occurs between controlling
shareholders and outside shareholders in equilibrium. We leave a detailed discussion of the
result to Section III. Before delving into an analysis of the model￿ s predictions, we ￿rst discuss
the model￿ s results under the benchmark model of perfect investor protection.
II. Benchmark: Perfect Investor Protection
In the benchmark model of perfect investor protection, the cost of diverting any positive amount
of bene￿ts is in￿nite. Therefore, the controlling shareholder optimally pursues no private ben-
e￿ts (s￿ = 0). (We denote the equilibrium variables in the benchmark model with an asterisk.)
Since there is no con￿ ict of interest, the ￿rst-best outcome is obtained in equilibrium, and
investment and Tobin￿ s q depend only on the preference and technology parameters (such as
16the volatility parameter ￿ that captures investment-speci￿c technology shocks).
When one unit of capital is purchased and invested in the ￿rm, the total capital stock of the
￿rm increases by one unit on average. However, the exact amount by which capital increases is
subject to uncertainty whose volatility is proportional to the amount of investment I, as seen
in the di⁄usion term in (1). The corresponding ￿rst-best Tobin￿ s q is
q￿ =
1
1 ￿ ￿2￿i￿ > 1; (24)
where i￿ is given by (18) with   = 0. First, note that Tobin￿ s q is equal to unity in a deterministic
environment (￿ = 0). Intuitively, capital accumulation is deterministic without adjustment
costs, and the production function has constant returns to scale. More generally, in equilibrium
Tobin￿ s q is larger than unity when capital accumulation is subject to shocks (￿ > 0) and
investors are risk averse (￿ > 0). This investment risk is systematic and is priced in equilibrium
by risk-averse investors. As a result, it drives a wedge between the prices of newly purchased
capital and installed capital.
It is worth comparing our model to the CIR model. The capital accumulation process
in CIR is subject to shocks whose volatility is proportional to the capital stock K: dK =
(I ￿ ￿K)dt+￿KdZt. While capital accumulation is stochastic, investment increases the capital
stock in a deterministic fashion. Therefore, there is no immediate investment risk, and no wedge
exists between the values of newly invested capital and installed capital. As a result, Tobin￿ s q
is equal to unity in CIR. To sum up, whether the volatility of capital accumulation is a function
of capital stock K (as in CIR) or depends on new investment I (as in our model) has important
implications for Tobin￿ s q. To the best of our knowledge, our neoclassical equilibrium model
￿ la CIR is the ￿rst to generate Tobin￿ s q larger than unity in the absence of technological
17frictions such as adjustment costs or investment irreversibility. Thus, unlike Abel and Eberly
(1994) and Hayashi (1982), who use adjustment costs to make Tobin￿ s q larger than unity, the
investment-speci￿c technology shocks in the capital accumulation process and the investor￿ s
risk aversion jointly generate q > 1 in equilibrium. Our work therefore provides a view on the
determinants of q, complementing the adjustment cost-based investment literature.
Having set up the benchmark, we next turn to the setting with imperfect investor protection.
III. Understanding the Equilibrium Solution
In this section, we provide intuition for the model￿ s no-trade equilibrium.9 We show that (i)
both the controlling and the outside shareholders ￿nd it optimal not to trade the risk-free asset
under the conjectured dividend and price processes, (ii) the conjectured price processes clear
the markets, and (iii) the conjectured dividends are consistent with the production decisions
of controlling shareholders.
A. The Controlling Shareholder￿ s Optimization Problem
Under the conjecture that the controlling shareholder holds zero risk-free bonds at all times
and cannot trade his ￿inside shares,￿ we have C1 (t) = M(t). The controlling shareholder￿ s
problem then essentially becomes a resource allocation problem. He chooses the ￿rm￿ s capital
accumulation, dividend payout, and private bene￿ts to maximize his own utility.
Let J1 (K) denote the controlling shareholder￿ s value function. The controlling shareholder￿ s












18where the optimization is subject to (6) and (3).
The left side of (25) is the ￿ ow measure of the controlling shareholder￿ s value function. The
right side of (25) gives the sum of the instantaneous utility payo⁄ u(M) and the instantaneous
expected change of his value function (given by both the drift and di⁄usion terms). The
controlling shareholder￿ s optimality implies that he chooses dividend policy D and stealing
fraction s to equate the two sides of (25). The ￿rst-order conditions with respect to dividend





M￿￿ (hK ￿ ￿shK) ￿ ￿2IJ00
1 (K)hK = J0
1 (K)hK: (27)
Equation (26) describes how the controlling shareholder chooses the ￿rm￿ s dividend and in-
vestment policy. The model has the usual trade-o⁄that an additional unit of dividend increases
consumption today (valued at M￿￿￿), but lowers consumption in the future by lowering invest-
ment (valued at J0
1(K)). In addition, increasing dividends generates an extra bene￿t by reducing
the volatility of future marginal utility (valued at ￿￿2IJ00
1(K)). This risk aversion/volatility
e⁄ect comes from: (i) The concavity of the value function due to risk aversion (J00
1(K) < 0), and
(ii) the fact that investment increases the volatility of capital accumulation because of shocks
to the marginal e¢ ciency of investment (see equation (1)).
Equation (27) describes the trade-o⁄s associated with the choice of private bene￿ts. The
bene￿ts associated with an incremental unit of stealing arise from increased current consumption
and lower volatility of future marginal utility. The marginal cost of stealing arises from lower
19investment and future consumption. Substituting (26) into (27) gives the optimal stealing
s(t) = ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)=￿: Intuitively, the stealing fraction ￿ is higher when investor protection is
worse (lower ￿) and con￿ icts of interest are larger (smaller ￿).
We now turn to the outside shareholder￿ s problem.
B. Outside Shareholder￿ s Optimization
To continue with the implications of our no-trade conjecture, we will suppose and then verify
later that in equilibrium the risk premium and interest rate are constant. Then, the outside
shareholder solves a standard Merton-style consumption and portfolio choice problem. The






Intuitively, ! increases in the expected excess return ￿, but decreases in risk aversion ￿ and
volatility ￿P.
In the conjectured no-trade equilibrium, the outside shareholder also needs to hold all his
wealth in equity (! = 1). Using (28) and imposing equilibrium yields
￿ = ￿￿2
P = ￿￿2i2: (29)
The ￿rst equality is the standard equilibrium asset pricing result where the equity premium is
equal to the product of the investor￿ s coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and the instantaneous
variance. The last equality states that the equity premium ￿ increases in the investment-capital
ratio i (see (21)).
20C. Intuition Behind the No-trade Equilibrium
Under the no-trade conjecture, the outside shareholder￿ s total wealth consists of his equity hold-
ings. Each share of equity o⁄ers both the outside shareholder and the controlling shareholder
dividends at the rate dK, where the dividend-capital ratio d is given in (19). In addition, the
controlling shareholder receives a perpetual ￿ ow of private bene￿ts of control. To be speci￿c,












Equation (30) shows that for each unit of dividends that the outside shareholder receives,




units. This constant proportionality between payments to the outside shareholder and the
controlling shareholder gives rise to identical growth rates of dividends and of the net payo⁄ to
the controlling shareholder between any two dates and any two states. Because in the no-trade
case we have C1 (t) = M (t), it follows that the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between
























Combining (31) and (32) allows us to conclude that the marginal rates of substitution for the
controlling shareholder and the outside shareholder are equal under the no-trade conjecture.
21Therefore, both controlling shareholders and outside shareholders have the same risk attitudes
toward securities such as the risk-free asset in equilibrium. However, controlling shareholders
and outside shareholders disagree in terms of the ￿rm￿ s investment decisions, as we show in
Section IV. Because outside shareholders only receive their pro rata share of dividends from
the ￿rm, if they were able to run the ￿rm, they would choose the ￿rst-best investment rule.
Instead, controlling shareholders are able to extract private bene￿ts of control in addition to
￿rm dividends, which generates an investment distortion.
In our model, the controlling shareholder is required to hold an underdiversi￿ed position
in his own ￿rm and may trade only the risk-free asset to smooth his consumption. Therefore,
he needs to solve an incomplete markets (self-insurance) problem, which admits no closed-form
solutions for the consumption rule and the value function when utility is of the CRRA type
(Zeldes (1989)). Moreover, in general, the equilibrium analysis of incomplete markets with
production is rather complicated. In our model, the controlling shareholder￿ s optimality and
the equilibrium resource allocations and prices are all solved in closed form and are well de￿ned
because of the speci￿c structure of the optimization problems. The following assumptions or
properties of the model are useful in delivering the analytically tractable no-trade equilibrium:
(i) A constant return to scale production and capital accumulation technology as speci￿ed in
(1); (ii) optimal ￿net￿private bene￿ts that are linear in the ￿rm￿ s capital stock (arising from
the assumptions that the controlling shareholder￿ s bene￿t of stealing is linear in s and his cost
of stealing is quadratic in s); and (iii) the controlling shareholder and the outside shareholder
have identical and homothetic preferences. The built-in linearity implies that in equilibrium
the economy grows stochastically on a balanced path. As such, in the remainder of the paper
we focus on variables scaled by capital stock, that is, the investment-capital ratio i = I=K and
22the dividend-capital ratio d = D=K.
IV. Equilibrium Investment and Asset Pricing Implications
First, we analyze equilibrium investment and capital accumulation. Then, we discuss the
model￿ s equilibrium implications for ￿rm value, the interest rate, return premium, volatility,
and the dividend yield.
A. Real Investment
Proposition 1 The equilibrium investment-capital ratio i decreases in investor protection ￿
and the controlling shareholder￿ s cash-￿ow rights ￿, which di=d￿ < 0 and di=d￿ < 0, respec-
tively.
Under weaker investor protection, the controlling shareholder diverts a higher fraction ￿
of output in each period. Since a larger fraction of a bigger pie is worth more, the rational
controlling shareholder values a larger ￿rm more under weaker investor protection. This leads
to more investment as investor protection weakens.
However, faster capital accumulation induces higher volatility in capital accumulation and
output. This leads to a higher equilibrium risk premium and hence discourages investment to
some extent. In a model like ours, we can show that the private bene￿ts incentive is a ￿rst-order
e⁄ect, and the investment-induced volatility/risk aversion e⁄ect is of second-order impact.10 In
summary, our model predicts that weak investor protection induces overinvestment relative to
a perfect investor protection benchmark. Similar intuition applies for the comparative statics
result with respect to ownership, ￿.
23There is a rich supply of empirical evidence on overinvestment and empire building in the
U.S. Harford (1999) documents that U.S. cash-rich ￿rms are more likely to attempt acquisitions,
but that these acquisitions are value decreasing as measured by either stock return performance
or operating performance.11 Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2003) document that one dollar
of cash holdings held by ￿rms in countries with poor corporate governance is worth much less
to outside shareholders than that held by ￿rms in countries with better corporate governance.
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Philippon (2004) document that U.S. ￿rms with low
corporate governance have higher investment.
The overinvestment-governance link ￿ts the evidence not only in developed economies, but
also across emerging market economies. A strong indicator that ￿rms in Korea and Thailand
overinvested is the documented volume of nonperforming loans prior to the East Asian crisis
in 1997 (25% of GDP for Korea and 30% of GDP for Thailand; see Burnside, Eichenbaum,
and Rebelo (2001)).12 China is another example of a country with a very large volume of
nonperforming loans in the banking sector. Allen, Qian, and Qian (2004) show that China has
had consistently high growth rates since the beginning of economic reforms in the late 1970s,
even though its legal system is not well developed and law enforcement is poor. Our paper
argues that the incentives for insiders to overinvest can at least partly account for China￿ s high
economic growth despite weak investor protection.13
Finally, note that the controlling shareholder￿ s incentive to overinvest in our model derives
solely from pecuniary private bene￿ts. In reality, controlling shareholders also receive nonpe-
cuniary private bene￿ts in the form of empire building or name recognition from managing
larger ￿rms. The pursuit of such nonpecuniary private bene￿ts exacerbates the controlling
shareholder￿ s incentive to overinvest (see also Baumol (1959), Williamson (1964), and Jensen
24(1986)). Also, controlling shareholders are often founding family members with a desire to
pass the ￿empire￿bearing their names down to their o⁄spring (Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer
(2003)). Incorporating these nonpecuniary private bene￿ts would increase the degree of over-
investment and amplify the mechanism described in our paper.
We next compute ￿rm value from the perspectives of outside shareholders and controlling
shareholders.
B. Tobin￿ s q and Controlling Shareholder￿ s Shadow (Tobin￿ s) q
Proposition 2 Tobin￿ s q increases with investor protection ￿ and with the controlling share-
holder￿ s cash ￿ow rights, with dq=d￿ > 0 and dq=d￿ > 0, respectively.
Intuitively, both outright stealing and investment distortions lower ￿rm value, as measured
by Tobin￿ s q. Stronger investor protection mitigates both stealing and investment distortion.
As a result, Tobin￿ s q is higher.
Empirical evidence largely supports the predictions in Proposition 2. La Porta et al. (2002),
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), and Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) ￿nd a positive
relationship between ￿rm value and investor protection. The incentive-alignment e⁄ect due to
higher cash ￿ ow rights is consistent with empirical evidence in Claessens et al. (2002) on ￿rm
value and cash ￿ ow ownership.
We now turn to the controlling shareholder￿ s (shadow) ￿rm valuation ^ P. Using the equi-





















We make two observations. First, it is obvious that ^ q is higher than q￿, which is Tobin￿ s
q under perfect investor protection as given in (24). By revealed preferences, the controlling
shareholder can always set the investment-capital ratio to i￿ and steal nothing s = 0, which
would imply ^ q = q = q￿. If instead he chooses s > 0 and distorts investment i > i￿, it must be
the case that ^ q > q￿. Second, using Proposition 2, we have q￿ > q for ￿rms under imperfect
investor protection. Combining these two results, it follows that shadow q is larger than the
￿rst-best Tobin￿ s q, which in turn is larger than Tobin￿ s q; ^ q > q￿ > q. This shows that
there is a the value transfer from outside shareholders to controlling shareholders when investor
protection is imperfect. However, outside shareholders are rational in the model and hence pay
the fair market prices for their shares.
C. Risk-Free Rate
The equilibrium interest rate r given in (23) is determined by three components: (i) The dis-
count rate ￿; (ii) an economic growth e⁄ect, ￿ (i ￿ ￿); and (iii) a negative precautionary savings
term, ￿￿2i2￿ (￿ + 1)=2. In a risk-neutral world, the interest rate must equal the subjective dis-
count rate ￿ in order to clear the market. This explains the ￿rst term. The intuition for the
second term, the growth e⁄ect, is that a higher net investment-capital ratio (i ￿ ￿) implies
that more goods are available for future consumption, raising the demand for current goods.
To clear the market, the interest rate increases. This e⁄ect is stronger when the agent is less
willing to substitute consumption intertemporally, which corresponds to a lower elasticity of
26intertemporal substitution 1=￿, or a higher ￿. The intuition for the precautionary e⁄ect is that
a high net investment-capital ratio increases the riskiness of ￿rms￿cash ￿ ows and makes agents
more willing to save. This preference for precautionary savings reduces current demand for
consumption and decreases the interest rate. The next proposition describes how the interest
rate changes with investor protection.
Proposition 3 The interest rate decreases in investor protection ￿ and ownership ￿ if and
only if 1 > ￿2 (￿ + 1)i.
Weakening investor protection has two opposing e⁄ects on the equilibrium interest rate.
Both e⁄ects result from investment being higher under weaker investor protection. First, the
economic growth e⁄ect leads to higher interest rates. Second, the precautionary savings e⁄ect
leads to a lower interest rate. The growth e⁄ect dominates the precautionary e⁄ect if and only
if 1 > ￿2 (￿ + 1)i. As demonstrated in the Appendix this condition is satis￿ed for su¢ ciently
low ￿, h, or  , and holds in all our calibrations below.
As a simple assessment of the empirical validity of Proposition 3, we use the long-run
average interest rate data in Campbell (2003) and separate the countries into civil law countries
(those with weaker investor protection) and common law countries (those with better investor
protection) following La Porta et al. (1998). Consistent with the model, the average real interest
rate for the sample of common law countries is 1:89% per year and statistically smaller than
the average real interest rate for the sample of civil law countries of 2:35% per year. Obviously,
a caveat is in order as these unconditional means do not control for other characteristics such
as default risk or liquidity.
We next turn to the predictions on volatility, risk premium, and the expected return.
27D. Volatility, Risk Premium, and Expected Return
Proposition 4 Return volatility ￿P, risk premium ￿, and the expected return all decrease in
investor protection ￿ and ownership ￿.
Recall that Proposition 1 shows that weaker investor protection generates incentives to
invest. Because investment generates volatility in the capital accumulation process (through
investment-speci￿c technology shocks), the rate of capital accumulation becomes more volatile
under weaker investor protection. With the economy on a balanced growth path, the return on
￿rm equity is also more volatile under weaker investor protection (recall that P (t) = qK (t)).
The equilibrium risk premium is given by
￿ = ￿￿2
P = ￿￿2i2: (35)
Hence, a larger volatility (due to greater investment) implies a higher equity risk premium in
equilibrium. The expected return on equity is given by the sum of the interest rate r and the
risk premium ￿. Since both r and the risk premium ￿ decrease in investor protection ￿, the
expected return on equity also decreases with the degree of investor protection.14
There is evidence in support of Proposition 4. Hail and Leuz (2004) ￿nd that countries with
strong securities regulation and enforcement mechanisms exhibit lower cost of capital than coun-
tries with weak legal institutions. Daouk, Lee, and Ng (2004) create an index of capital market
governance that captures di⁄erences in insider trading laws, short-selling restrictions, and earn-
ings opacity. They model excess equity returns using an international capital asset market
model that allows for varying degrees of ￿nancial integration. Consistent with Proposition 4,
they show that improvements in their index of capital market governance are associated with
28lower equity risk premia. Harvey (1995) shows that emerging markets display higher volatility
of returns and larger equity risk premia. Bekaert and Harvey (1997) correlate their estimated
conditional stock return volatilities with ￿nancial, microstructure, and macroeconomic vari-
ables and ￿nd some evidence that countries with lower country credit ratings, as measured by
Institutional Investor, have higher volatility. Since emerging market economies and countries
with worse credit ratings have on average weaker corporate governance, this empirical evidence
is consistent with our theory.
We now brie￿ y provide a characterization of the dividend yield. Let y be the equilibrium
dividend yield: y = D=P = d=q: We have the following proposition.
Proposition 5 The dividend yield is given by
y = ￿ + (￿ ￿ 1)
￿






The dividend yield decreases (increases) with the degree of investor protection ￿ when ￿ > 1
(￿ < 1).
Weaker investor protection gives rise to a higher investment-capital ratio, but also a more
volatile dividend-output process. As we discuss earlier, the e⁄ect of investor protection on
growth (via incentives to ￿steal and overinvest￿ ) is stronger than the e⁄ect on volatility (via
precautionary savings). Therefore, whether the dividend yield y increases or decreases in ￿ only
depends on the sign of ￿ ￿ 1. For logarithmic utility investors (￿ = 1), the dividend yield is
constant and equal to the investors￿subjective discount rate ￿. This is the standard result: The
logarithmic investor does not have an intertemporal hedging demand (Merton (1971)). When
￿ > 1, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (1=￿) is less than unity, implying that the
29income/wealth e⁄ect in consumption is stronger than the substitution e⁄ect. As a result, the
net impact of strengthening investor protection (increasing ￿) enhances ￿rm value by a greater
percentage than it does for dividends. Therefore, the dividend yield y decreases with ￿ when
￿ > 1. For ￿ < 1, the substitution e⁄ect is stronger and the opposite result holds.
Next , we quantify the e⁄ects of imperfect investor protection using our analytically tractable
framework.
V. Quantifying the E⁄ects of Investor Protection
In this section we ￿rst provide a calibration of the parameters. Then, we calculate the impli-
cations on stock market revaluation and wealth redistribution if investor protection were to be
made perfect.
A. Calibration
Our model is quite parsimonious for a heterogeneous-agents equilibrium model, having only
seven parameters. As a result, the calibration procedure is easier, more transparent, and also
more robust. Indeed, we show that our main quantitative results on stock market revaluation
and welfare bene￿ts from enhancing investor protection are e⁄ectively unchanged under vari-
ous moment calibrations, provided that we match the empirically documented level of private
bene￿ts of control.
As is standard, some parameters are obtained by direct measurements conducted in other
studies. These include the risk aversion coe¢ cient ￿, the depreciation rate ￿, the rate of
time preference ￿, and the equity share of the controlling shareholder ￿. The remaining three
parameters (￿;￿;h) are selected so that the model matches three moments in the data.
30We calibrate the model to the U.S. and South Korea. Starting with the ￿rst set of parame-
ters, we choose the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion ￿ to be 2, and the subjective discount
rate ￿ to be 0:01 (Hansen and Singleton (1982)). The annual depreciation rate is set to 0:08.
These parameters are common to both the U.S. and Korea. We choose the share of ￿rm own-
ership held by the controlling shareholders to be ￿ = 0:08 for the U.S. and ￿ = 0:39 for Korea
(Dahlquist et al. (2003)), representing the percentage of overall market capitalization that is
closely held.
For the second set of parameters, we calibrate the productivity parameter h, the volatility
parameter ￿, and the investor protection parameter ￿ so that the model matches (i) the real
interest rate, (ii) the standard deviation of output growth, and (iii) the ratio of private bene￿ts
to ￿rm value, (^ q ￿ q)=q. The average U.S. real interest rate is set to 0:9% (Campbell (2003)).
The Korean annual real interest rate is set to 3:7%, obtained as the average annual real prime
lending rate in the period 1980 to 2000 using data from the World Bank World Development
Indicators (WDI) database. Using the WDI data set, we set the annual standard deviation
of output growth in the U.S. to 2% and that in South Korea to 3:77%. Finally, the ratio
of the dollar value of private bene￿ts to ￿rm value (in the model and in Dyck and Zingales
(2004), this is equal to ￿(^ q ￿ q)=q) is set to 0:2% in the U.S. and 8:6% in Korea.15 Using
our calibrated values for ￿, we have that (^ q ￿ q)=q is equal to 2:5% in the U.S. and 22% in
Korea, respectively. The resulting calibrated parameters are (￿;￿;h) = (￿:25;2325;￿:0897) for
the U.S. and (￿;￿;h) = (￿:397;28:44;￿:1187) for Korea. For both countries, these parameters
imply that the model matches all three moments exactly.
The calibrated model implies a stealing fraction (￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)=￿) of 0:04% for the U.S. and
2:14% for Korea, which is 54 times higher than that of the U.S. The ￿ ow costs of stealing as a
31fraction of gross output (￿(s;hK)=hK = (1 ￿ ￿)
2 =2￿) are 0:02% for the U.S. and 0:65% for
Korea, respectively. Note that under the calibration ownership concentration is much higher in
Korea than in the U.S., consistent with empirical evidence that ownership is higher in countries
with weaker investor protection (La Porta, L￿pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999)).16
B. A Stock Market Analysis of Imperfect Investor Protection
Consider the hypothetical experiment of improving investor protection to the perfect benchmark
level (￿ = 1). Using our calibrated baseline parameters, the model predicts that moving to
perfect investor protection produces a U.S. stock market revaluation (measured by (q￿ ￿ q)=q)
of 2:49% and a Korean stock market revaluation of 21:96%. The dollar value of these stock
market revaluations can be obtained by multiplying the numbers above by the respective stock
market capitalization. Using the 1997 market capitalization values from Dahlquist et al. (2003),
the stock market revaluation results in an increase of $281 billion (i.e., 2.49%￿$11.3 trillion)
in U.S. stock market capitalization and $9.2 billion (i.e., 21.96%￿$42 billion) in Korean stock
market capitalization.
These numbers suggest that agency con￿ icts have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on ￿rm value. More-
over, the size of the stock market revaluation accompanying the improvement in investor pro-
tection matches closely the controlling shareholder￿ s private bene￿ts of control. The following




^ q ￿ q
q
￿ ￿￿2 (i ￿ i￿): (37)
The size of the revaluation is thus approximately equal to the ratio of the private bene￿ts
to ￿rm value, (^ q ￿ q)=q, plus a term that re￿ ects the di⁄erence of the volatility/risk aversion
32e⁄ects under imperfect versus perfect investor protection. The latter term is economically
negligible compared with the ￿rst term (^ q ￿ q)=q for any reasonable calibration of volatility
and risk aversion. We conclude that the stock market revaluation calculation above is robust
to model parameters so long as the model is required to match the size of private bene￿ts in
the economy (e.g., (^ q ￿ q)=q = 22% in Korea). This result con￿rms our earlier intuition that
the private-bene￿ts e⁄ect dominates the risk aversion/volatility e⁄ect.
We next measure the welfare cost of weak investor protection.
C. A Welfare Analysis of Imperfect Investor Protection
One approach to quantify the net e⁄ect of imperfect investor protection on the aggregate econ-
omy is to use a welfare criterion that weighs the utility levels of the controlling shareholder
and the outside shareholder. Because of the inherent subjectivity of this approach, we in-
stead compute measures of equivalent variations for the outside shareholder and the controlling
shareholder. Both measures quantify the wealth redistribution from outside shareholders to
controlling shareholders, and do not require us to make any subjective assumptions on welfare
weights.
For the outside shareholder, we compute the fraction of capital stock (1 ￿ ￿2) that the out-
side shareholder is willing to give up for a costless and permanent improvement in investor
protection from the current level ￿ to the ￿rst-best level of ￿ = 1. We measure the wel-
fare e⁄ects of changing investor protection as a fraction of the capital stock rather than the
wealth level because the latter involves a valuation that depends on the current level of investor
protection. The outside shareholder is indi⁄erent if and only if the following equality holds:
J￿
2(￿2K0) = J2(K0); (38)
33where J2(￿) and J￿
2(￿) are the outside shareholder￿ s value functions in terms of capital stock
under the current level of investor protection ￿ and perfect investor protection ￿ = 1, respec-
tively, and K0 is the current capital stock level. Using the explicit value function formula for










where d and y are the dividend-capital ratio and the dividend yield, respectively.
While the outside shareholder loses from weak investor protection, the controlling share-
holder bene￿ts. For the controlling shareholder, we compute the fraction of capital stock
(￿1 ￿ 1) that he needs in order for him to voluntarily give up the status quo of imperfect
investor protection in exchange for perfect investor protection ￿ = 1. Therefore, we have
J￿
1(￿1K0) = J1(K0); (40)











The following proposition characterizes the comparative static properties of ￿2 and ￿1 with
respect to investor protection ￿.
Proposition 6 The outside shareholder￿ s utility cost is higher under weaker investor protec-
tion, with d￿2=d￿ > 0: The controlling shareholder￿ s utility gain is higher with weaker investor
protection, with d￿1=d￿ < 0. For any ￿ < 1, 0 < ￿2 < 1 < ￿1.
34Outside shareholders are willing to give up a substantial part of the capital stock that they
own for stronger investor protection. Even for the U.S., outside shareholders are willing to
give up 0:38% of their capital stock if U.S. investor protection can be made perfect. In Korea,
outside shareholders are willing to give up 11:17% of their capital stock to adopt perfect investor
protection. The utility losses for outside shareholders associated with weak investor protection
are due to both stealing and investment distortions.
Clearly, in terms of the percentage of their owned capital stock, Korean outside shareholders
value the enhancement of investor protection more than U.S. investors do. However, the total
welfare gain for outside shareholders from improving investor protection is much larger in the
U.S. than in Korea because of the much higher capital stock in the U.S. To express the welfare
gains in dollar terms, we compute (1 ￿ ￿2)qK0, where q is the value of Tobin￿ s q under the status
quo. The adjustment for q expresses the welfare gains as a fraction of the market value of the
capital stock as opposed to its book value. Our calculations show that outside shareholders gain
$43 billion (i.e., ￿ .38%￿$11.3 trillion) and $4.7 billion (i.e., 11.17%￿$42 billion) in the U.S.
and Korea, respectively, if investor protection can be made perfect. The total dollar value gain
for outside shareholders in the U.S. is about 10 times the gain for outside shareholders in Korea.
These calculations indicate that the bene￿ts of improving investor protection are economically
signi￿cant. Next, we show that our quantitative results on welfare costs are robust.
Table I presents results from various calibrations of the model that depart from the above
baseline model calibration in the following way. With each new value of ￿, ￿; or ￿, we re-
calibrate ￿, ￿; and h to ensure that the model matches the three moments used in the baseline
calibration (the real interest rate, the standard deviation of output growth, and the ratio of
private bene￿ts to ￿rm value). The conclusion from Table I is clear. Provided that the model
35is required to match empirically observed private bene￿ts among other moments, the welfare
cost of imperfect investor protection to U.S. or Korean investors is quite robust across di⁄erent
calibrations.
[Table I here.]
While we show that the utility gain from increasing investor protection is large for outside
shareholders, we do not view policy interventions to improve investor protection as an easy
task. This is not surprising, even if one ignores costly implementation, because improving
investor protection involves a di¢ cult political reform process that reduces the bene￿ts to
incumbents. The resulting wealth redistribution is signi￿cant with controlling shareholders in
the U.S. (Korea) losing about 2:1% (8:4%) of their capital stock when moving to the benchmark
case of perfect investor protection. Moreover, the controlling shareholders are less subject to
the collective action problem than outside shareholders are because there are fewer controlling
shareholders than outside shareholders, and the amount of rents at stake for each controlling
shareholder is substantial. Thus, incumbent entrepreneurs and controlling shareholders are
often among the most powerful interest groups in the policy making process, particularly in
countries with weaker investor protection. It is in the vested interests of controlling shareholders
to maintain the status quo, since they enjoy the large private bene￿ts at the cost of outside
outside shareholders and future entrepreneurs.
VI. Empirical Evidence
In this section, we empirically explore the following implications from our technological assump-
tions (equation (1)) and the equilibrium balanced growth solution (Theorem 1):
36Proposition 7 The standard deviations of GDP growth and stock returns are given by ￿i.
Speci￿cally, we test whether (i) the standard deviation of GDP growth is positively cor-
related with the investment-capital ratio and (ii) the standard deviation of stock returns is
positively correlated with the investment-capital ratio. We control for other sources of uncer-
tainty that may arise from cross-country variations in ￿.18
A. Data
We use the World Bank￿ s World Development Indicators (WDI) annual real per capita GDP
for the 1960 to 2000 period to measure the volatility of GDP growth. All available data by
country are used to estimate the volatility of GDP growth. We measure the volatility of stock
returns by using the monthly return series from MSCI (starting in January of 1970 for some
countries). We restrict the sample to countries for which an MSCI index exists and the ratio of
market capitalization to GDP is at least 10% by the year 2000. Because the variable DCIVIL
is not available for Hungary, Morocco, Poland, and China, these countries are excluded from
the analysis, leaving 40 observations.19
We estimate a country￿ s long-run average investment-capital ratio using aggregate data.
Because the model￿ s capital-GDP ratio is constant, that is, dY (t)=Y (t) = dK (t)=K (t), we
can use the capital accumulation equation (1) to obtain the long-run GDP growth rate (i ￿ ￿):
Hence, the investment-capital ratio is the sum of the long-run mean of real GDP growth and
the depreciation rate ￿, which is set at 0:08. Note that the premise of this procedure is that
of a constant capital-GDP ratio within a country, but not across countries. Following King
and Levine (1994), we estimate the long-run mean GDP growth rate using a weighted average
of the country￿ s average GDP growth rate and the world￿ s average GDP growth rate with the
37weight on world growth equal to 0:75. The weighting of growth rates is meant to account for
mean-reversion in growth rates. In spite of the balanced growth path assumption underlying
this estimate, King and Levine (1994) show that it produces estimates of investment-capital
ratios that well match those computed using the perpetual inventory method.
We conduct our tests controlling for several variables that may directly or indirectly a⁄ect
volatility. First, we control for measures of investor protection using a country￿ s legal origin
(DCIVIL = 1 for a civil law country and 0 for a common law country) and the anti-director
rights variable from La Porta et al. (1998) (ANTIDIR assigns a higher score for better investor
protection.) Second, we control for sources of volatility that can capture cross-country variation
in ￿. As measures of aggregate uncertainty, we use the volatility of real exchange rate returns
(SDRER),20 and the degree of openness as given by the 1960 ratio of exports plus imports to
GDP (OPEN).
B. Results
Figure 1 and columns (1) to (5) in Table II report the results for the relation between the
standard deviation of output growth and the investment-capital ratio. Figure 1 illustrates
a positive (unconditional) association as predicted by the model. Table II shows that the
signi￿cance of this association survives the inclusion of control variables. Regression (1) in
Table II documents the association illustrated in Figure 1 (the coe¢ cient on I=K is 1:033
with a p-value of 0:002). The estimated coe¢ cient implies that 60% of the growth volatility
di⁄erential between the U.S. and Korea may be explained by di⁄erent investment-capital ratios
in these countries.21 In regressions (2) to (5), we add several controls for other sources of
volatility, one at a time. The coe¢ cients for the investment-capital ratio across regressions (1)
to (5) vary a little, but are all signi￿cant. Controlling for the volatility of the exchange rate
38return (SDRER) contributes the most explanatory power (regression (4)), where the coe¢ cient
on SDRER has a p-value less than:001 and the regression displays an adjusted ￿ R2 equal to
0:441.
[Figure 1 and Table II here.]
Figure 2 and columns (6) to (10) in Table II present the results for the association between
the standard deviation of stock returns and the investment-capital ratio. (For an analysis of
conditional volatility, see Bekaert and Harvey (1997).) As predicted by the model, Figure
2 illustrates a positive (unconditional) association between these variables. Regression (6)
in Table II gives the numbers underlying the statistical association in Figure 2. (The slope
coe¢ cient is 2:288, with a p-value of 0:038.) This estimate implies that 31% of the stock return
volatility di⁄erence between the U.S. and Korea is due to the di⁄erent investment-capital ratios
in the two countries.22 In regressions (7) through (10), we add controls for other sources
of volatility, one at a time. The signi￿cance of I=K remains despite some variation in the
estimated coe¢ cients, mainly when SDRER or OPEN are included in the regressions. Again,
adding SDRER contributes the most explanatory power (p-value < 0:001 and ￿ R2 = 0:312).
[Figure 2 here.]
VII. Conclusions
Corporate governance is a ￿rst-order issue in many countries where ￿rms are often run by
controlling shareholders. Much empirical work documents the e⁄ects of imperfect investor
protection on private bene￿ts and ￿rm value around the world. However, there is limited
39theoretical research on the e⁄ects of investor protection on capital accumulation, asset pricing,
and welfare costs in an equilibrium context.
We develop one of the ￿rst dynamic stochastic general equilibrium frameworks to study
the e⁄ects of con￿ icts of interest between controlling shareholders and outside shareholders
on welfare and equilibrium asset pricing when investor protection is imperfect. Despite the
con￿ icts of interest and the heterogeneity of investment opportunities between the controlling
shareholders and outside shareholders, we are able to characterize the equilibrium asset prices
and resource allocation in closed form. The analytical formulae allow us to derive precise the-
oretical predictions on investment and asset prices and to generate new economic intuition on
the relevant economic mechanisms. The key insights are as follows. Weaker investor protection
implies higher levels of private bene￿ts, which in turn produce stronger incentives for overin-
vestment. A larger level of investment induces higher capital accumulation volatility (due to
investment-speci￿c shocks), which is priced in equilibrium via a higher risk premium. In equi-
librium, the agency channel (of pursuing private bene￿ts) dominates the risk aversion/volatility
e⁄ect. As a result, weaker investor protection leads to lower Tobin￿ s q, a higher interest rate,
higher volatility of asset returns, and a higher risk premium. These predictions are consistent
with existing evidence.
Moreover, our model allows us to make quantitative statements on the signi￿cance of weak
investor protection on investors￿welfare and market valuation. We show that strengthening
investor protection produces a signi￿cant wealth redistribution e⁄ect from controlling share-
holders to outside shareholders. Outside shareholders in Korea are willing to give up 11.2% of
their capital stock holdings, or $4.7 billion of current wealth, in exchange for perfect investor
protection. In the U.S., outside shareholders are willing to give up 0.38% of their capital stock
40holdings, or $43 billion of current wealth. Our quantitative results on welfare are quite robust
but hinge upon the empirically observed large private bene￿ts of control, as reported by Dyck
and Zingales (2004). However, the political process to improve investor protection is naturally
di¢ cult because the political power of controlling shareholders and incumbent entrepreneurs is
much stronger than that of outside investors and future entrepreneurs.
It is worth emphasizing that our key insights depend on the controlling shareholders￿in-
centives to overinvest and on the assumption of investment-speci￿c technology shocks, but do
not depend crucially on the model￿ s analytical tractability. That said, our model does not
capture other prominent features of asset prices, such as time variation in risk premia and
volatility. Extending our paper to generate more realistic time-series properties of asset prices
is an interesting avenue for future research.
Another limitation of our model is that all ￿rms and controlling shareholders are identical.
This restrictive assumption is made for analytical convenience. Allowing for heterogeneity across
￿rms within a country permits the study of other interesting and important issues, such as cross-
sectional ￿rm equity returns. For example, the controlling shareholder￿ s risk sharing motives
and induced time-varying equilibrium wealth distribution will have additional e⁄ects on welfare
and asset pricing. We think that the mechanism proposed here remains important in this more
general and complex setting, although the magnitudes of the mechanism are likely to change.
The ￿rm-homogeneity assumption naturally implies no dynamic interactions between ￿rms. In
a model in which capital is allocated across ￿rms and the funds available for investment are
scarce, overinvestment in one ￿rm with weaker governance suggests underinvestment in other
￿rms. This generates additional welfare losses for the economy, in line with Rajan and Zingales
(1998), who provide empirical evidence that capital does not always ￿ ow to its most productive
41use in countries with lower ￿nancial development.
42Appendix
This Appendix contains the proofs for the theorem and propositions in the main text.
Throughout we make use of the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 :h > ￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿):
Assumption 2 :1 ￿ ￿ < ￿.
Assumption 3 :2(￿ + 1)[(1 +  )h ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]￿2 ￿ ￿
￿
1 + (1 +  )h￿2￿2:
Assumption 4 :(1 ￿ ￿)h > i.
Assumption 5 :￿ + (￿ ￿ 1)(i ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)i2￿2=2 > 0:
Assumption 1 states that the ￿rm is su¢ ciently productive and thus investment will be
positive for risk-neutral ￿rms under perfect investor protection. Assumption 2 ensures agency
costs exist and lie within the economically interesting and relevant region. Assumptions 3 and
4 ensure positive real investment and positive dividends, respectively. Assumption 5 gives rise
to ￿nite positive Tobin￿ s q and dividend yield. While we describe the intuition behind these
assumptions, obviously we cannot take the intuition and implications of these assumptions in
isolation. These assumptions jointly ensure that the equilibrium exists with positive ￿nite net
private bene￿ts, investment rate, dividend, and Tobin￿ s q.
Proof of Theorem 1. We conjecture and verify that the controlling shareholder￿ s value
















where m = M=K and i = I=K are the controlling shareholder￿ s equilibrium consumption-
capital ratio and the ￿rm￿ s investment-capital ratio, respectively. Substituting the stealing
function into (6) gives















is an agency cost parameter and d is the dividend-capital ratio. Substituting (A.1) and (A.2)

























The above equality implies the following relation:





where y is the dividend yield and is given by
y = ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(i ￿ ￿) +
1
2
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿2i2 : (A.4)






This inequality will be used in proving the propositions.









1 + (1 +  )h￿2￿
i + (1 +  )h ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ ￿ = 0: (A.6)














￿ = ￿2 ￿
1 + (1 +  )h￿2￿2
￿
1 ￿
2￿(￿ + 1)￿2 ((1 +  )h ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ ￿)




In order to ensure that the investment-capital ratio given in (A.7) is a real number, we require
that ￿ > 0, which is explicitly stated in Assumption 3. Next, we choose between the two roots
for the investment-capital ratio given in (A.7). We note that when ￿ = 0, the investment-capital
ratio is
i = [(1 +  )h ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ ￿]=￿;
as directly implied by (A.6). Therefore, by a continuity argument, for ￿ > 0, the natural solution





















where y is the dividend yield and is given by (A.4).








It is equivalent to verify limT!1 E
￿
e￿￿TK(T)1￿￿￿



































Therefore, the transversality condition will be satis￿ed if ￿ > 0 and the dividend yield is positive
(y > 0), as stated in Assumption 5.
Now we turn to the optimal consumption and asset allocation decisions for the outside
shareholder. Let J2(K) denote the outside shareholder￿ s value function in terms of the ￿rm￿ s
capital stock K. Under the no-trade equilibrium conjecture, we can verify that the outside


































where A2 = q (1 ￿ ￿)
1￿￿ =d￿: Following Merton (1971), we can conclude that the outside share-
holder￿ s consumption rule is given by
C2(t) =
￿







(1 ￿ ￿)qK (t);
where we use W2(t) = (1 ￿ ￿)qK (t): The portfolio rule is reported in (28). The transversality








Recall that in equilibrium, the outside shareholder￿ s wealth is all invested in ￿rm equity and
thus his initial wealth satis￿es W2(0) = (1 ￿ ￿)qK0. Since the outside shareholder￿ s wealth
dynamics and the ￿rm￿ s capital accumulation dynamics are both geometric Brownian motions
with the same drift and volatility parameters, it follows immediately that the transversality
condition for the outside shareholder is also met if and only if the dividend yield y is positive,
as stated in Assumption 5.
To complete the proof of the theorem, we also give the equilibrium interest rate and Tobin￿ s
q. In equilibrium, the outside shareholder￿ s consumption is C2 (t) = (1 ￿ ￿)D(t). Applying
Ito￿ s lemma to the outside shareholder￿ s marginal utility, ￿2(t) = e￿￿tC2 (t)
￿￿, we obtain the
47following process for the stochastic discount factor:
d￿2(t)
￿2(t)






￿ (￿ + 1)dt:
The drift of ￿2 equals ￿r￿2, where r is the equilibrium interest rate. Importantly, the implied
equilibrium interest rate by the controlling shareholder￿ s ￿1 and the outside shareholder￿ s ￿2 are
equal. This con￿rms the leading assumption that the controlling shareholders and the outside
shareholders ￿nd it optimal not to trade the risk-free asset at the equilibrium interest rate.
Tobin￿ s q can be obtained by computing the ratio of market value to the replacement cost












Using the de￿nitions ￿2(t) = e￿￿tC2 (t)
￿￿ = e￿￿t (yW2 (t))
￿￿, D(t)=K (t) = d, and W2 (t)=K (t) =












m1￿￿K (t) = qK (t) ;
using the conjectured controlling shareholder￿ s value function J1 (K).




























where the ￿rst equality uses (A.9), the second equality uses (17), and the third follows from
simpli￿cation.
48A constant q and dividend-capital ratio d immediately implies that the drift coe¢ cients for
dividend, stock price, and capital stock are all the same, that is, ￿D = ￿P = ￿K = i ￿ ￿, and
the volatility coe¢ cients for dividend, stock price, and capital stock are also the same, that is,
￿D = ￿P = ￿K = ￿i. A constant risk premium ￿ is an immediate implication of constant ￿P,
constant dividend-capital ratio d, and constant equilibrium risk-free interest rate.
Proof of Proposition 1. De￿ne
f(x) =




1 + (1 +  )h￿2￿
￿x + (1 +  )h ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿): (A.11)
Note that f (i) = 0, where i is the equilibrium investment-capital ratio and the smaller of the
zeros of f. Also, f (x) < 0 for any value of x between the two zeros of f and is greater than or










< 0 if and only if Assumption 5 is met. Hence, under Assumption 5,
i < ￿￿1￿￿2. Also, under Assumption 1, f (0) = (1 +  )h ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) > 0; which implies
that i > 0.
Abusing notation slightly, use (A.11) to de￿ne the equilibrium investment-capital ratio
implicitly as f (i; ) = 0. Taking the total di⁄erential of f with respect to   and using the










1 ￿ ￿￿2i + ((1 +  )h ￿ i)￿2:
49At the smaller zero of f, i < ￿￿1￿￿2. Together with (1 +  )h ￿ i > (1 ￿ ￿)h ￿ i = d > 0, this
implies that di=d  > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. We prove the result with respect to ￿. The case for the
controlling shareholder￿ s ownership ￿ is then immediate. Use the expression for the dividend
yield in (36) to express Tobin￿ s q as the ratio between the dividend-capital ratio d and the



























































where the inequality uses ￿ > 0 and di=d￿ < 0.










and note that di=d  > 0. Hence, the interest rate is lower when investor protection improves
if and only if 1 > ￿2 (￿ + 1)i, or using (A.8), if and only if
￿ > 2[(1 +  )h ￿ (￿ + 1)((1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿)]￿2:
This inequality is always true if (1 +  )h ￿ (￿ + 1)((1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿) < 0; otherwise, it holds for
su¢ ciently low ￿, h, or  .
Proof of Proposition 4. Weaker investor protection or lower share of equity held by the
50controlling shareholder both lead to a higher agency cost parameter  . Proposition 1 shows
that a higher   leads to more investment and hence both higher volatility of stock returns
￿2
P = ￿2i2 and higher expected excess returns ￿ = ￿￿2
P. To see the e⁄ect of investor protection












which is strictly positive under Assumption 5. Expected returns are higher with weaker investor
protection or a lower share of equity held by the controlling shareholder.
Proof of Proposition 5. We ￿rst use the equivalent martingale measure to derive the
formula for dividend yield. Adjusting for risk, the dividend process (under the risk-neutral
probability measure) is as follows:23
dD(t) = gD(t)dt + ￿DD(t)d ~ Z(t); (A.12)
where ~ Z(t) is the Brownian motion under the risk-neutral probability measure and g is the

















In turn, the dividend yield y is given by y = r ￿ g.
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51Note that the agency cost parameter   decreases with both investor protection and ￿ and
ownership ￿. The proposition then follows.



































where the inequality uses di=d￿ < 0 (from Proposition 1) and ^ q > q. Because d￿2=d￿ > 0 and
































where we use d =d￿ < 0 and m =
￿y
1￿￿￿2i (implied by (A.3)). Because d￿1=d￿ < 0 and
lim￿!1 ￿1 = 1, we have ￿1 > 1 for any ￿ < 1.
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Figure 1: Scatter plot and linear ￿t of the volatility of GDP growth on the





















































































Figure 2: Scatter plot and linear ￿t of the volatility of stock returns on the
investment-capital ratio across countries. See the text for country abbreviations.Table I
Welfare Costs of Imperfect Investor Protection
The table quanti￿es the welfare cost to outside shareholders from an absence of perfect investor protection
under various calibrations. For the baseline case, we set ￿ = 0:01, ￿ = 2, and ￿ = 0:08 for both U.S.
and Korea. To re￿ ect di⁄erent degrees of ownership concentration in the U.S. and Korea, we choose
￿ = 0:08 for the U.S. and ￿ = 0:39 for Korea (Dahlquist et al. (2003)). Column 2 reports the results
under the baseline calibration. In columns 3 to 5, we recalibrate the values of the triplet (￿;h;￿) to
match the real interest rate, the standard deviation of output growth, and the ratio of private bene￿ts
to ￿rm value each time we change ￿, ￿, and ￿. The remaining three parameters are the same as those
in the baseline case.
Outside shareholders￿ Baseline Discount Risk Depreciation
welfare cost (1 ￿ ￿2) model rate, ￿ aversion, ￿ rate, ￿
0.02 0.03 1 3 0.07 0.09
U.S. 0.38% 0.38% 0.38% 0.39% 0.37% 0.38% 0.38%
Korea 11.17% 11.17% 11.17% 11.32% 11.13% 11.17% 11.17%Table II
Investment-to-Capital Ratio and Aggregate Volatility
The table presents the regression results for (i) the volatility of real GDP growth and (ii) the volatility
of stock returns. Independent variables are the investment-to-capital ratio (I/K), the antidirector rights
index (ANTIDIR), a dummy for civil law countries (DCIVIL), the standard deviation of changes in the
real exchange rate (SDRER), and the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP (OPEN). Each cell reports
the coe¢ cient estimate from ordinary least squares regressions and below it the corresponding White-
corrected p-value on the null that the coe¢ cient is zero. All regressions include an intercept term and
use 40 (country) observations.Standard Deviation Standard Deviation
Independent of Real GDP Growth of Stock Returns
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
I=K 1.033 0.963 1.167 1.478 1.177 2.288 2.615 2.842 3.626 3.413









￿ R2 0.133 0.126 0.148 0.441 0.123 0.049 0.056 0.087 0.312 0.104
65Notes
1There are two layers of corporate governance determining the induced agency costs for
any given ￿rm, namely, there are country-wide regulatory and enforcement environment mech-
anisms, and ￿rms-speci￿c corporate governance rule. This paper focuses on di⁄erences in
imperfect investor protection at the country level.
2Danthine and Donaldson (2004) study the manager-shareholder agency con￿ ict and its
implications for the aggregate economy within a contracting environment.
3Lan and Wang (2006) integrate imperfect investor protection as in La Porta et al. (2002)
into an otherwise standard intertemporal investment model with adjustment costs (Abel and
Eberly (1994)) and show that managers overinvest in order to increase future private bene￿ts,
which further reduces ￿rm value. Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Love. (2002) consider a risk-
averse controlling shareholder, but use an exogenously given stochastic discount factor to study
the e⁄ects of imperfect investor protection on the ￿rm￿ s cost of capital.
4The formulation in Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Hu⁄am (1988) is a stochastic version of
Solow (1960). An alternative interpretation of (1) is as a stochastic installation function. In-
tuitively, how productive new investments are depends on how well they match vintages of
installed capital. Hence, (1) constitutes an extension of the deterministic installation function
analyzed in Uzawa (1969) and Hayashi (1982).
5Albuquerque and Wang (2004) propose an international variation of the model analyzed in
this paper, using TFP shocks. In that paper, we obtain results similar to those obtained in this
paper. For example, the risk premium and the interest rate decrease with investor protection
in both papers.
6We treat ￿ as constant. We assume that the controlling shareholder cannot easily trade
his shares due to an adverse price impact. The assumption of constant ownership for the
controlling shareholders is consistent with La Porta et al.(1999), who empirically show that
66controlling shareholders￿ownership share is quite stable over time.
7See Barclay and Holderness (1989) for early work on the empirical evidence in support
of private bene￿ts of control. See also Johnson et al. (2000), Bae, Kang, and Kim (2002),
Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002), and Dyck and Zingales (2004).
8We think of ￿ as capturing the role of laws and law enforcement protection of minority
investors. However, it can be broadly associated with monitoring by outside stakeholders (see,
for example, Burkart, Gromb, Panunzi (1997)).
9The standard way to analyze the equilibrium is to solve the optimization problems of both
the controlling shareholder and outside shareholder for postulated price processes, and then to
aggregate agents￿demands to ￿nd the prices that clear the markets. This approach generates a
mapping whose ￿xed points are the equilibria of the model, but is computationally demanding
for heterogeneous-agent models such as ours.
10Mathematically, we are able to show that the trade-o⁄between private bene￿ts and lowering
volatility becomes linear-quadratic after solving an intertemporal optimization problem.
11See also Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991), Blanchard, L￿pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1994),
and Lamont (1997).
12While these local ￿rms bene￿tted from government subsidies via, for example, a low bor-
rowing rate, a low borrowing rate by itself does not generate a large size of nonperforming
loans. Thus, while a subsidized borrowing channel encourages socially ine¢ cient overinvest-
ment, it does not imply overinvestment from the ￿rm￿ s perspective, given the subsidized cost of
funds. Our argument that ￿rms overinvest because of weak investor protection remains robust
even in the presence of other frictions such as government subsidies.
13While we do not formally model state-owned enterprises in this paper, in practice these
￿rms are not much di⁄erent than the ￿rms with controlling shareholders as described in our
model. The cash ￿ ow rights of the managers come from their regular pay, which in general
depends on ￿rm performance, and the control rights come from the government appointing the
67manager.
14While Proposition 3 for the interest rate requires a bit stronger condition, the result on the
expected equity return does not. To see this, it is immediate to show
r + ￿ = ￿ + ￿ (i ￿ ￿) ￿
1
2
￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿2i2:
Note that d(r + ￿)=d￿ = ￿
￿




1 ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿2i
￿
> 0 for all admissible
parameters. Therefore, the net sign e⁄ect of ￿ on the expected return is the same as the e⁄ect
of ￿ on investment. From Proposition 1, we know that stronger investor protection curtails
investment and hence lowers expected returns.
15These numbers coincide with the conservative lower bounds on private bene￿ts reported in
Table III of Dyck and Zingales (2004). The highest estimates reported in Table III in Dyck and
Zingales (2004) are 4:4% for the U.S. and 15:7% for Korea, respectively. Barclay and Holderness
(1989) estimate that private bene￿ts for the U.S. are 4% of ￿rm value.
16Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer (2003) and Lan and Wang
(2006) provide theoretical explanations for this cross-country empirical ￿nding. Mueller and
Philippon (2006) show that the quality of labor relations across countries also plays an important
role in determining the concentration of ownership, after controlling for cross-country variations
in protection for outside investors.







































18Note that the investment-capital ratio is invariant to a ￿rst order with respect to ￿. Mathe-
68matically, the derivative of the investment-capital ratio with respect to ￿ is approximately zero
when evaluated at realistically low values of ￿ (i.e., di=d￿ = 0 at ￿ = 0). This means that our
model predicts that if all of the cross-country variation in the highlighted volatility measures
comes from variation in ￿, then we should not be able to detect any association between the
volatility measures and the investment-capital ratio even if we do not control for ￿ in the re-
gressions. Provided we ￿nd such an association, we can then reasonably conclude that it is not
solely due to cross-country variation in ￿. Intuitively, in the model, cross-country variation in ￿
only adds noise to the correlation between output growth volatility and the investment-capital
ratio because it makes the volatility numbers change without any corresponding movement in
investment.
19Univariate regressions suggest that including these countries would not change the results.
The countries (and country abbreviations) are: Argentina (ARG), Australia (AUL), Austria
(AUT), Belgium (BEL), Brazil (BRA), Canada (CAN), Chile (CHL), Colombia (COL), Den-
mark (DEN), Egypt (EGY), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (GER), Greece (GRE),
Hong Kong (HK), India (IND), Ireland (IRE), Israel (ISR), Italy (ITA), Japan (JAP), Malaysia
(MAL), Mexico (MEX), the Netherlands (NET), New Zealand (NZ), Norway (NOR), Pak-
istan (PAK), Peru (PER), Philippines (PHI), Portugal (POR), Singapore (SIN), South Africa
(SA), South Korea (KOR), Spain (SPA), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (SWI), Thailand (THA),
Turkey (TUR), the U.K., the U.S., and Venezuela (VEN).
20Following the suggestions by Pindyck and Solimano (1993), we also try the volatility of
in￿ ation and obtained similar results.
21The investment-capital ratios in the U.S. and Korea are 0:107 and 0:117, respectively. The
annual growth volatility for are 0:0204 and 0:0377 for the U.S. and Korea, respectively. Hence,
we have 1:033 ￿ (0:117 ￿ 0:107)=(0:0377 ￿ 0:0204) = 0:6.
22The investment-capital ratios in the U.S. and Korea are 0:107 and 0:117, respectively.
The standard deviations of stock returns are 0:0447 and 0:1195, respectively. Hence, we have
2:288 ￿ (0:117 ￿ 0:107)=(0:1195 ￿ 0:0447) = 0:31.
6923Using Girsanov￿ s theorem, the dynamics of the Brownian motion under the risk-neutral
probability measure are given by
d ~ Z(t) = dZ(t) + (￿=￿D)dt:
24The ￿rst equality in (A.13) is the standard asset pricing equation. The second equality uses
the pricing formula under the risk-neutral probability measure and ~ E denotes the expectation
under the risk-neutral probability measure. The last equality uses the dividend dynamics (A.12)
under the risk-neutral probability measure.
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